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The sociocultural self-creation of a natural category: 
Social-theoretical reflections on human agency under the temporal conditions of the 
Anthropocene 
 
Piet Strydom 
University College Cork, Ireland 
 
Abstract 
Following the recent recognition that humans are an active force in nature that gave rise to a new 
geological epoch, this essay explores the implications of the shift to the Anthropocene for social 
theory. The argument assumes that the emerging conditions compel an expansion and deepening of 
the timescale of the social-theoretical perspective and that such an enhancement has serious 
repercussions for the concept of human agency. First, the Anthropocene is conceptualized as a 
nascent cognitively structured cultural model rather than simply a geological epoch. Second, the vast 
and deep timescale in the light of which the new time unit and its generative agency alone make 
sense is analysed along the human world’s objective, sociocultural and subjective axes. Finally, the 
elements of the concept of agency are recomposed in their temporal and relational contexts. At the 
reflexive level throughout, the need for social theory to develop a cognitive-theoretical approach in 
conjunction with a weak naturalistic ontology is suggested. 
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The notion of the Anthropocene hardly needs introduction today, given that it is being used 
profusely in a variety of disciplines, from the natural sciences to the humanities, and has even 
become an object of chatter in the media, among politically aware citizens and in politics. A 
minimum of pointers toward the origin and meaning of the idea will therefore suffice. 
 
The original broaching of the idea by Eugene Stoermer in the 1980s, its establishment by the Nobel 
laureate Paul Crutzen in 2002 and its popularization by Will Steffen and others since 2007 had been 
prepared for by a number of earlier authors. In 1873, for example, the Italian Antonio Stoppani 
(2013) proclaimed that humankind has entered a new age, the ‘Anthropozoic’, but his proposal fell 
on deaf ears. In 1938, even before the American atomic weapons tests which are now regarded as 
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the beginning of the Anthropocene (Zalasiewicz et al., 2015), the famous Russian founder of the 
science of the biosphere, V. I. Vernadsky, presciently pinned down the essence of the idea avant la 
lettre when he submitted that: 
‘the activity of Man appears as a geological factor…and is reflected in large-scale 
phenomena of a planetary scale…..We are living in a brand new, bright geological  
epoch. Man, through his labour – and his conscious relationship to life – is transforming 
 the envelope of the Earth – the geological region of life, the biosphere’ (2000-1: 22). 
In 1968, Serge Moscovici echoed this insight in his book on ‘the human history of nature’, writing 
that ‘[h]umans have become a geological force with enormous effect’, to which he added: ‘the 
biomorphic character of human activities…[indicates that]…human agency is a version of the 
universal process’ (1982: 498, my translation). And some five years before Crutzen’s eye-opening 
essay of 2002, Peter Vitousek et al. (1997) compiled the necessary evidence for what they called ‘the 
human domination of Earth’s ecosystems’. 
 
The responses to the idea of the Anthropocene vary widely. At present, the Working Group on the 
Anthropocene (2015) is preparing the way for the leading geologists of the International Commission 
of Stratigraphy to brood over the thorny question of whether the idea possesses any scientific merit. 
Besides an idea, this authoritative body requires an enduring global physical marker – what is called 
‘chronostratigraphy’ or simply ‘time-rock’ (Revkin, 2012: 5). Seeking to give reality to Crutzen’s 
expressed hope that the idea will lead to changed attitudes and practices, environmentalists and the 
change community are not waiting for the scientific decision, but rather enthusiastically propagate 
its transformative potential. For their part, the media (e.g. Lewis, 2009; Kolbert, 2011; The 
Economist, 2011; Revkin, 2012; Nestler, 2015) are exuberantly trumpeting the arrival of ‘The Human 
Age’ characterized by the re-establishment of humans on their pedestal after their humiliating 
demotion by Copernicus and Darwin. At one pole, the business community and their political 
handmaidens and henchmen are relishing the opportunities created by the idea for what will 
effectively turn out largely to be neo-colonialist ventures (Schulz, 2016). At the opposite pole, 
disadvantaged and poor communities are bracing themselves for what the developed world’s 
assertion of its newfound Anthropocenic domination of Earth might bring to their modest doorsteps 
and depleted livelihoods (Rose, 2013). And, finally, cautious thinkers are warning against jumping on 
the bandwagon in view of the possibility that whatever merit the idea does have will rapidly 
dissipate if green technology and a decarbonized economy result in the curtailment or even 
elimination of the factors behind global warming and climate change. 
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As for sociologists, not untypically, they are coming late to the idea and will no doubt find their 
conceptualization and research endeavours entangled in this hornet’s nest of competing and 
contradictory responses. The majority of those who pay attention to the idea, again not untypically, 
would probably join the environment and change activists without thinking too much about the 
remaining appropriations of the idea. It could be predicted with confidence that the least likely 
response would be the productive one of understanding the idea of the Anthropocene as compelling 
the long overdue expansion and deepening of the timescale of social theory and sociology. Neither 
the cognitive revolution nor the weak naturalistic turn diverted them from their myopic sociologistic 
and culturalistic ways, while a book dealing seriously with the topic of time and social theory (Adam, 
1990) hardly left a trace, despite having received a British Sociological Association award in 1991. 
But considering the obvious radical implication that the idea has for the central concept of agency, 
the time might well now be right to contemplate such a fundamental shift in perspective. 
 
This being my hope, the aim of this piece is threefold: first, to present a social-theoretical conception 
of the Anthropocene as a semantically and symbolically rich cognitive cultural model that is 
structured by principles selected from the cognitive order of society; second, to draw conclusions 
from the Anthropocene as a time unit about the necessity of an expanded, deepened, 
multidimensional conception time; and third, to relate the concept of agency in the sense of a 
capacity for variable engagements to this differentiated understanding of time so as to see it 
operating in different contexts at a number of different levels. In the course of taking these steps, 
suggestions are made in reflexive mode about those theoretical and ontological features of social 
theory itself that need rethinking under the conditions inaugurated by the Anthropocene – that is, 
innovatively departing in two distinct yet closely interrelated directions: a cognitive theoretical and a 
weak naturalistic one. 
 
A social-theoretical conception of the Anthropocene 
As the names of Stoppani, Vernadski, Moscovici and no doubt others indicate, there has been an 
intensifying feeling since the second half of the nineteenth century that humankind is on the brink 
of, or has entered, a new epoch. It is this subterranean motivating sense deriving from being caught 
between the old and the new that provided Stoermer and, joining him, also Crutzen with the 
necessary basis for the coining of the neologism, the Anthropocene. But even before this term was 
hardened into a viable concept and publicly aired in the early years of the twenty-first century, 
scientists like Vitousek and his colleagues were searching for the necessary evidence to sustain the 
argument that human activities have begun to override natural ecosystemic processes and cycles. In 
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the meantime, a good deal more evidence has been forthcoming which, in the view of many, 
confirms that humankind has entered a new geological epoch of its own making. 
 
Through these shifts from feeling via evidence to conceptualization in the course of a protracted 
development shines a semiotic process that logically exhibits the interrelated moments of 
abduction, induction and deduction (Peirce, 1998; Strydom, 2011). The concept of the 
Anthropocene, presupposing both a disclosing perspective and the collation of indices of a new 
geological time interval, is what ultimately allows conclusions to be drawn about reality and its 
relevant components. It is evident that the meaning it carries is by no means exclusively of a logical 
nature. On the contrary, as the heated debates about it and the concomitant actions show, it also 
has an emotional and pragmatic resonance effect on those interpreting it – irrespective of whether 
scientists, environmentalists, change activists, journalists, business executives, the disadvantaged 
and poor or cautious and incautious thinkers. It is no wonder, then, that it is a highly controversial, 
socially contested construct that calls forth a wide variety of responses, both in words and actions. 
And it is entirely comprehensible why so many of those who are in some way or other drawn into 
the sphere of signification and discourse delimited by the concept are not waiting and, indeed, 
cannot wait for the heavyweights of the International Commission on Stratigraphy to scientifically 
formalize and legitimize the concept. 
 
Considering that the concept of the Anthropocene allows different inferences to be drawn and thus 
equally different judgements to be formed about reality and certain of its components, it is apparent 
that it possesses structural aspects that facilitate cognitive processes necessary for the acquisition 
and articulation of knowledge. This implies that there are a number of conceptions of a class of 
constructs to which the Anthropocene would also belong that would not be sufficient to make the 
nature of the latter adequately comprehensible. Three such conceptions which seem to be relatively 
closely related in a certain respect are readily available in the literature – Umberto Eco’s (1972) 
semiotics, Richard Dawkins (1989) and Daniel Dennett’s (1996) memetics and, finally, Dan Sperber’s 
(2002) epidemiological approach. In some sense, all of them focus on culture but are distinct from 
one another in that they decompose it in different ways. In the present context, this is taken as 
correctly suggesting that, in a key sense, a phenomenon like the Anthropocene is not just a material 
object, but has to be social-theoretically understood in terms of culture. Yet, the cognitive social 
theory employed here to theorize the Anthropocene does so with a decisive difference. 
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This theory also assumes a particulate conception of culture like the three positions mentioned 
above, but by contrast with them it breaks culture down neither into free-floating semantic units like 
Eco, nor into gene-like memes like Dawkins and Dennett, nor finally into individual mental 
representations and behaviour that are then located in an ecological environment like Sperber. The 
focal units are instead the cognitive properties that are in an intelligible manner mediated through 
the micro-, meso, macro- and meta-dimensions of sociocultural reality – properties that do bear a 
trace of the object of reference, yet can be reduced neither biologically nor infra-individually. The 
emphatic inclusion of the meta-dimension furthermore indicates at least two considerations that are 
relevant in the present context. The first is that social reality is understood within an immanent-
transcendent framework (Strydom, 2011) that escapes the strong naturalism of Dawkins, Dennett 
and Sperber in favour of a weak naturalistic ontology which is complemented by a cognitive realist 
epistemology.1 The former, going beyond Eco’s strong culturalism, celebrates the continuity 
between nature and the human sociocultural form of life, which allows appreciation for the 
Anthropocene as a geological epoch in which humans are implicated; and the latter admits the 
treatment of certain features of sociocultural reality as nevertheless beyond natural determination, 
which makes room for the Anthropocene as cultural phenomenon. Of great importance, second, is 
the need to make a vital distinction where the referenced authors and many others besides fail to 
clearly differentiate – that is, the distinction between immanently located and operating cultural 
models and the transcendent meta-level cognitive order (Strydom, 2015a, In press) which is 
necessary for adequately grasping the cultural nature of the Anthropocene and without which one 
would be unable to account for its socially contested nature.   
 
On the one hand, the immanent cultural models consist of more or less rich symbolically packaged 
semantic content, but as such they are cognitively structured. Their cognitive structuration, on the 
other hand, emanates incursively and recursively from the meta-level or transcendent cognitive 
order. It indeed has roots in individual brain-minds or the human organic cognitive endowment, but 
is articulated and mediated through action, practices, social interaction and communication of all 
sorts after having been stabilized as common presuppositions for a number of millennia. This 
stabilization occurred on two levels – that is, through the phylogenesis of the mind characteristic of 
Homo sapiens sapiens (Mithen, 1998) and through sociocultural evolution enabling the organization 
of sociocultural life. The components of the cognitive order of the sociocultural form of life include, 
among many others, what Peirce (1998: 197) called the universally assumed ‘ideas of human 
life…[such as]…Truth, Right, and Beauty…[that serve as]…Ends’ for human cognitive processes and 
activities.2 
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In the present context, the most appropriate example of a cultural model or, rather, of a candidate 
for becoming a full-fledged cultural model, is the Anthropocene. In conjunction with the 
identification of a new geological epoch, it has only very recently begun to take shape through as yet 
incomplete inferential and judgement processes.3 These processes are, first, motivated by disclosing 
abductive feelings regarding the perceived state of the world; second, structured by deductions 
drawing from and selectively combining different components of the cognitive order; and, finally, 
informed by the tentative inductive forays into domains of potentially relevant indices. But it is the 
principles of the meta-level cognitive order that render inference, assessment and judgement of 
relevant matters possible. 
  
The distinction and difference in level between immanent cultural models and the transcendent 
cognitive order and, hence, between the distinct directing and guiding potencies they possess and 
exert, can be clarified and justified by recourse to a venerable intellectual tradition of serious 
research and design work done by mathematicians, scientists, philosophers and logicians over the 
past 2000 years which has had a thorough-going impact on social theory. In the course of a certain 
line of thought running from Aristotle, via Hindu-Arab thought, Galileo, Newton, Leibniz and Kant, to 
philosophers and modern mathematicians such as Peirce, Dedekind and Cantor, a fundamental 
distinction which came to inform many a discipline, including social theory, has become stabilized 
and legitimized, both mathematically and philosophically. In mathematics, it is known as the 
distinction between the ‘convergent series’ and ‘divergent series’ (Dantzig, 2007: 150-51; Kline 1990: 
1110). The best known example of a convergent series from mathematics is pi (π). When it is 
algorithmically derived, a number is obtained which grows ever longer in decimal places and tends 
ever closer toward the value of π, the growth being infinite and the value in principle remaining just 
out of reach. Decimal places could be added indefinitely, but the calculation of π will never finish. 
This endlessly ongoing series with its finite yet ideal limit, the unattainable value, is since Aristotle 
(2015: Book III, Part 6) known as ‘potential infinity’. A divergent series, by contrast, is one in which 
the addition of more and more numbers leads to a total that outgrows any boundary one might try 
to impose. This exponentially accumulating series with its projected sought after totality, its infinite 
ideal limit, is known as ‘actual’ or ‘complete infinity’. 
 
In philosophy, Kant (1968: B386=A330-B388=A332) took cues from this mathematical distinction in 
identifying two continuous or infinite series – what he respectively called the ‘descending series’ on 
the side of the conditioned which represents a ‘process of becoming’ possessing potentiality; and the 
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‘ascending series’ on the side of the conditions which we can never comprehend in its totality, but in 
respect of which we nevertheless must envisage such a totality given ‘in its completeness’ if we were 
to be able to make inferences and judgements. Complete infinity in this sense, contrary to Aristotle, 
is a logically possible idealization and, although it does not apply to any experiential object, is 
nevertheless indispensable for making sense of such objects, as long as it is internally coherent and 
consistent. Such a complete totality of conditions refers to our necessary and unavoidable 
presuppositions without which it is impossible not just to investigate any object domain, but also to 
create and organize society. It represents the infinite ideal limit of the accumulative divergent or 
ascending series. There is of course also a third infinite series implied here – the subjective 
dimension from which sense is made of the descending and ascending series. While Kant conceived 
it in the solipsistic form of the transcendental subject of knowledge, it has since become understood 
in communicative terms (Peirce, 1992; Apel, 1980; Habermas, 1984). 
 
Now, to cut a long story short, these ideas not only lie behind fundamental parametric social-
theoretical assumptions, but also inform the distinction between immanent cultural models and the 
transcendent cognitive order. On the one hand, the Anthropocene as a cultural model is conceived 
as the finite yet ideal limit concept of the infinite process of becoming of nature, or natural history, 
in which the sociocultural form of life is embedded. As such, it is a concrete immanent value – in 
conjunction with others discussed below (see Figure 1) – that humans have begun to work toward 
but which, like π, will always recede as an ideal that cannot be fully realized. On the other hand, the 
cognitive order is conceived as complete infinity, the totality of conditions, that has ascended over 
millennia and became stabilized as the set of infinite ideal limits of the historical and evolutionary 
accumulation of the necessary and unavoidable conceptual, logical and mathematical foundations of 
Homo sapiens sapiens’ sociocultural form of life – embracing such principles as truth, right and 
beauty, but also many others, for instance, nature, number, justice, equality, solidarity, truthfulness 
and so forth. These principles provide the commonly presupposed cognitive parameters and 
material for the construction of cultural models, including the emerging model of the Anthropocene. 
 
Time and social theory in the wake of the Anthropocene 
The Anthropocene is an idea that arose due to disturbing feelings about the quality of the world and 
confirmation by a variety of perceived indicators that those feelings are by no means mistaken. On 
this basis, the idea has not only been hardened into a concept, but it is for some time already in the 
process of being constructed into a new cultural model (see Figure 1). It is a model of the universal 
process of the spontaneous natural generation of forms of which the human species forms part and 
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actively helps to drive and direct. A vital factor in its construction is that this species has become 
acutely aware of this unity and the geophysical and biomorphic nature of its practices. As such, this 
cultural model is structured and formed by presupposed principles of the cognitive order, more 
precisely, by variable selective combinations of those principles, depending on the angle of 
interpretation, appropriation, response and action of the different groups involved. At a minimum, 
commonly taken-for-granted presuppositions belonging to the conceptual and quasi-conceptual 
foundations of the sociocultural form of life are drawn upon, including for example, truth, nature, 
humans, unity, process, practice, justice, number or measure (e.g. degrees Celsius, carbon molecule 
count, profit), life, crisis, consciousness, responsibility and so forth. 
 
To this list should be added, furthermore, the concept of time, for the idea of the Anthropocene 
stretches beyond the awareness of the unity of humankind and nature and the role of the former in 
the latter in so far as it itself belongs to a larger multidimensional patterned process. The tendency 
that is becoming conventional is to regard it as classifiable as the geological epoch following upon 
the sequence of the Pleistocene (last glacial epoch) and the Holocene (subsequent warm epoch). 
This sequence falls under the Quaternary period which covers some 2.588 million years, the 
Anthropocene being its most recent epoch. But in the geological timescale of hierarchically ordered 
aeons, eras, periods, epochs and ages, the Anthropocene forms part of yet a longer timespan 
(Stanley, 2005). The consideration that besides an idea, concept or cultural model, it also refers to a 
time unit that fits into so-called ‘deep time’, leads the sense of time to morph into an awareness of 
billions of years of Earth history and the evolution of life. The age of planet Earth is reckoned to be 
circa 4.54 billion years, while the evolution of life unfolded through successive waves of forms, from 
single-cellular organisms, via multicellular sea life growing in complexity and a whole variety of 
insects, land animals, plants and mammals, to the appearance of the Homo line some 1.8 million 
years ago. But of particular importance is the evolutionary outcome that represents the subject of 
the Anthropocene – namely, anatomically modern Homo sapiens sapiens. Not only does it possess 
the unprecedented brain-to-body ratio (EQ: encephalization quotient) of 5.4 (Stringer, 2012) and 
cognitively fluid mind which appeared as recently as between 60,000-30,000 years ago (Mithen, 
1998), but by 16th July 1945 it was also able to leave sufficient chemico-stratigraphically identifiable 
traces of radionuclide to draw the boundary between the Holocene and the Anthropocene 
(Zalasiewicz, 2015).  
 
It is obvious that the emergence of the Anthropocene understood as a time unit which 
contemporary humans themselves inhabit and help shape must have profound implications for 
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social theory. To begin with, it compels reflection on the manner in which time figures in it. Once 
such reflection surveys the process into which the Anthropocene slots, social theory’s typical myopic 
social and historical sense of time gets re-contextualized by a vast, layered timescale 
accommodating simultaneously occurring temporalities. The sobering insight that follows is that 
social theory cannot but expand and deepen the timescale relevant to its perspective. Such 
expansion and deepening require the incorporation of an awareness of different times and features 
of time. Taking cues from its own historical-theoretical background and foundational assumptions 
reviewed earlier, the relevant features of time can be identified in terms of infinite processes – the 
objective, sociocultural and subjective – and their limit concepts or, differently, in terms of the 
temporal features of process and structuration. 
 
First, there is the vast and deep time of the objective world – that is, the timescale of natural history, 
including Earth history events (e.g. successive time intervals, including the Anthropocene) and 
biological history or palaeontological events (e.g. life and periodical mass extinctions, including 
contemporary species extinction) which is systematized in evolutionary terms with reference to 
irreversible temporal achievements (Stanley, 2005; Schopf, 1999). Particularly important for social 
theory is to incorporate an understanding of the biological time of the human species (Stringer, 
2012), particularly the transition from Archaic Homo sapiens (EQ 4.3) and Homo sapiens (EQ 5.3) to 
Homo sapiens sapiens (EQ 5.4) in their respective time units with a view to grasping better what is 
characteristic of the latter and, hence, significant for inhabiting and shaping the Anthropocene – for 
example, organically endowed capacities and both actual and possible elaborations and 
developments of competences. Crucial here is the central temporal anatomical structure, namely, 
the phylogenetically shaped, cognitively fluid mind of contemporary humans (Mithen, 1998; 
Strydom, 2015d), which is structurationally of the greatest importance. It is not only presupposed by 
the construction of the Anthropocene as a cultural model representing the finite ideal limit value of 
the infinite objective process, which is the most relevant immanent structurational time feature 
today and thus the one toward which humankind has begun to tend. At the same time, it is also the 
natural evolutionary basis of the cognitive order which primarily through its principle of truth 
incursively draws the parameters of this cultural model and recursively regulates its application. 
 
The time of the sociocultural world, the second infinite process, is of course much more familiar to 
social theorists (Adam, 1990). Most prominent is the explicitly formulated and symbolically 
articulated concept of time which finds expression in particular in the universally imposed calendar 
and clock time with its many ramifications for the organization of social life. Now, however, it needs 
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to be appreciated as being embedded in the vast and deep timescale of the objective world which 
embraces multiple times and temporalities. Not only sustained natural cycles like day and night or 
the seasons and biological cycles like birth, growth and death substructure sociocultural time, but 
also the more specific temporal conditions of the particular geological epoch in which it falls. Then 
there are the organizational features of time, such as attentional focalization, prioritization, 
ordering, coordination and sequencing so pervasive in social life, which have roots in natural and 
biological soil. Of particular significance from the viewpoint of the expansion and deepening of social 
theory’s sense of timescale are those features making up elementary social forms that humans share 
with their Homo ancestors and contemporary primates which show up in behaviour and social 
arrangements of all sorts (Bateson, 1973; Jackendoff, 1999; Kaufmann and Clément, 2007; Piaget, 
1983). Such forms often operate in social life virtually unmodified, at times with ill-effects which 
provide starting points for critique, learning and transformation in a more sociocultural direction. 
 
When the sociocultural world is considered as an infinite process with an associated accumulated 
limit value, however, time appears in yet another light. On the one hand, if it is a matter of the 
infinite process of becoming or historicity, then time comes into play as a dimension that lends itself 
to the creation, production or construction of the sociocultural form of life. Such generative 
activities take place through the interrelation in the present of different, often socially contested 
orientations to the future via recourse to the past as well as to time congealed in artefacts, social 
and cultural objects and technologies. On the other hand, the historically accumulated and 
evolutionarily stabilized design and evaluative features of time loom large as limit concepts that are 
necessary for the incursive structuring and recursive regulating of the temporalized process of 
becoming as it follows its meandering course. As made clear earlier, these features of accumulated 
time take the form both of finite ideal limit concepts or immanent cultural models and of infinite 
ideal limit concepts or transcendent cognitive order principles. Whereas the creative, productive or 
constructive process of becoming borne by a plurality of different actors follows the trajectory of the 
arrow of time, the cultural models and, especially, the cognitive order hold position against the 
relentless impetus of the arrow of time to secure the irreversible, accumulated, temporal 
achievements emerging structurally from the process.4 The Anthropocene as the nascent cultural 
model assigned to the infinite process of the objective world is complemented on the side of the 
sociocultural world by a matching, equally nascent cultural model of a democratic-cosmopolitan 
world or global society (see Figure 1). Here the rejection of the separation of nature and society 
would show in the reorganization of social relations as the levelling of the unjust class hierarchy of 
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human capacities and competences in harmony with the new conditions and the cognitive order 
principle of right. 
 
Figure 1: Infinite Processes and Limit Concepts in the Anthropocene 
  
                    Limit concept: 
 
     finite ideal:             infinite ideal: 
               cultural model          cognitive order      
      meaning          validity 
                semantic/symbolic generality           cognitive universality 
 
                 TRUTH 
      b 
            Infinite series: 
     a 
  Objective Anthropocene: sustainable human-nature relation 
                  RIGHT 
      b 
    
     a 
World:  Sociocultural  democratic-cosmopolitan world/global society 
           TRUTHFULNESS 
      b 
    
     a 
  Subjective  cognitively-fluid subject appropriate to  
a democratic-cosmopolitan existence in  
a cared-for planetary biosocial ecosphere 
Key: 
a = decreasing or convergent series: indefinite tendency toward a finite limit value 
b = increasing or divergent series: historically long-term accumulation and evolutionary stabilization  
    of universally presupposed rational potentials 
 
The third and final infinite process with its associated limit concepts, the formation and cultivation of 
subjectivity, has its own characteristic times and temporalities. Subjectivity is inextricably embedded 
in the vast and deep evolutionary timescale that is marked, on one extreme, by distant evolutionary 
ancestors possessing a social module going back some 35 million years and, on the other, by the 
emergence of hominins some six to seven million years ago toward the end of the Miocene and their 
evolution via three or four different human species to Homo sapiens sapiens most recently. Besides 
the biologically given organic and cognitive endowment, subjectivity also shares in the characteristic 
phylogenetically acquired, cognitively fluid species mind which has been shaped to a significant 
degree also by social and, later, by cultural factors (Mithen, 1998; Stringer 2012; Dunbar 2014; 
Strydom, 2015d). 
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As this temporal embedding of subjectivity has by no means been left behind, it is still as relevant 
today as at any moment in previous periods and epochs. Here elementary evolutionarily acquired 
social forms are of importance, but also and especially dormant capacities as yet locked up in both 
the organic endowment and the mind that could over time be developed into competences required 
by future imperatives. Such extraction and development require the multiple times of ontogenesis, 
maturation, socialization and individuation which presuppose time-sensitive and time-consuming 
cognitive processes of various kinds, from biological information exchange to socially and culturally 
important aggregative, dialogical or interactive and discursive learning processes (Strydom, 2009). In 
felicitous cases, the outcomes of these processes are evidenced by such qualities as health, 
autonomy, authenticity, a sense and consciousness of time, aesthetic freedom, an inferential and 
reflexive-critical ability, creativity, a sense of well-being, moral consciousness, self-expression, self-
realization and the ability to engage in speech, interaction, actions of various kinds and, if need be, 
transformative praxis. 
 
The larger process of the formation of subjectivity is in principle also conditioned by time in the 
sense that it transpires within the substantive context of a historically specific sociocultural world 
which itself is embedded in a particular geological epoch. Subject-formation is thus inevitably and 
fundamentally affected by a transition from one geological epoch to another and the unavoidable 
concomitant reconfiguration of the sociocultural world. Reconfiguration involves reflection on and 
articulation of the structure and semantic potential of cognitive order principles and their rethinking 
and re-appropriation in the light of changing conditions, the related alteration or construction of 
cultural models and corresponding changes in the organization of social life. But subject-formation 
as an externally induced and socially manifest process requires to be complemented from the inside 
by self-cultivation which entails a multidimensional learning process involving appropriate timing, 
sequencing and linking with the irreversible temporal achievements and imperatives of the time. 
Absolutely central to such a learning process, whether the social actor’s or the social theorist’s, is the 
reframing of the relevant set of subjective cognitive structures or schemata in relation to, and in 
interaction with, the reconfiguration of cognitive order principles and symbolically packaged cultural 
models. This applies to all the different social actors engaging in the generative historical-
constructive process. 
 
As regards the cognitive order, truthfulness qua infinite ideal limit concept is the chief principle that 
lays down the parameters of the process of subject-formation and self-cultivation. In turn, the 
immanent cultural model qua finite ideal limit concept that has begun to substantively direct and 
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guide the cultivation of subjectivity under the currently emerging conditions is what can be 
circumscribed as a fully cognitively fluid subject that is appropriate to a democratic-cosmopolitan 
world or global society in a cared-for planetary biosocial ecosphere. In a characteristically human 
manner, the subject that is emerging at present is increasingly able to relate in a self-referential and 
self-reflexive way to its nascent conditions of existence – that is, the ecological context and the 
cultural models of the Anthropocene, a democratic-cosmopolitan society and a cognitively fluid 
subject, all of which require that the cognitive order principles of truth, right and truthfulness be 
reflexively related to and acted upon (see Figure 1). Considering the plurality of different social 
actors, such reflexive relation and action can and typically do take distinct, even competing and 
conflicting forms. The unfolding of the complementary processes of subject-formation and self-
cultivation already in train today obviously promises to be a difficult, even painful, protracted 
process that will require time – much time from a human perspective, but less that a nanosecond in 
terms of geological and evolutionary time. 
 
Agency in context 
The first section proceeded from the widely accepted assumption that the Anthropocene is a natural 
phenomenon – a new geological epoch recently inaugurated by human activities which 
demonstrably began to overshadow natural ecosystemic processes and cycles in a variety of ways. 
To this view the social-theoretical argument was added that the Anthropocene is simultaneously a 
cultural phenomenon – an idea arising from human experience and perception which was 
sufficiently hardened into a concept to serve as the starting point and vehicle for development into a 
cultural model possessing the efficacy of a directing and guiding orientation complex for thought and 
action. The second section then explored this complex of relations in terms of the multiple 
manifestations of time in the infinite processes transpiring in the objective, sociocultural and 
subjective worlds. At every level in both these sections, the continuity of nature and humans 
together with their sociocultural world and, hence, the relations of mutual implication stood out 
graphically. Simultaneously, however, it was equally apparent that in certain respects, 
predetermined by the cognitively fluid species mind and reflected in cultural models and the 
cognitive order, humans and their sociocultural world are at times capable of transcending the 
determination of nature and the relentless forward rush of the arrow of time. It is in this context of 
both nature and the sociocultural world with its immanent and transcendent dimensions that the 
question of agency under the temporally articulated contextual conditions of the Anthropocene has 
to be considered. 
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In social theory, it has been conventional to locate human agency strictly within the sociocultural 
domain, whether it was correctly understood as a capacity for variable engagements or confused 
with the outcomes of agency. A blinkered sociologistic and, more recently, a culturalistic outlook 
prevailed. Only now, with the advent of the Anthropocene in the course of which we are 
encountering emergent events which are problematizing our familiar world, both in social life and in 
social theory, are we compelled to expand and deepen our perspective so as to be able to develop 
an innovative way of mediating between the old and the new and the past and the future. 
Irrespective of their differences, all the theorists who have ventured statements on agency since the 
upsurge of interest in the concept some four decades ago have without exception remained 
beholden to sociologism and/or culturalism. Leaving aside older writings, two examples of relatively 
recent contributions that advance claims to a comprehensive treatment of the concept bear this out. 
Neither of them appreciates the need for the expansion and deepening of the timescale of social 
theory and, thus, for broadening the understanding of agency enforced by the transition to the 
Anthropocene. 
 
Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998: 1012, 963) present their extensive article as the only 
study that ‘radically reconceptualized’ agency and dealt with it in its ‘full complexity’. That this is an 
exaggerated claim, however, is confirmed by their befuddlement in the face of Mead’s inclusion of 
references to the physical, biological and evolutionary aspects relevant to a temporal theory of 
agency and their consequent incomprehensible exclusion of them on the grounds of their being 
‘metaphysical’ (1998: 969). Against this it should be insisted that not only is agency a capacity rooted 
in the human organic and cognitive endowment which had been evolutionarily acquired in a physical 
environment, as Mead (1959) recognized in his combining of Newton, Einstein and Darwin with 
Kant, but it is also manifest in humans in so far as they are part of nature and a factor in it which 
exerts itself as a geophysical and biomorphic force, as evidenced by the emergence of the new 
geological epoch. 
 
Barry Barnes, unlike Emirbayer and Mische, does appreciate in his campaign against individualistic 
notions of agency such as Roy Bhaskar’s and Anthony Giddens’ that there is continuity between 
nature and the sociocultural world. Accordingly, he describes his position on one occasion as 
‘uncompromisingly monistic naturalistic’ in the sense that human agency and behaviour have 
‘causal, “biological” antecedents’ (2000: 151, 80). But on another, he qualifies it as ‘a sociological 
version of compatibilism’, which implies a commendable moderation of strong naturalistic monism 
so as to allow room for the sociocultural world and ‘members’ own accounts of each other as free 
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agents’ (2000: xi, 80). Since continuity for him means at most that ‘human beings may be 
understood naturalistically as social creatures’ (2000: ix), however, agency as a collective capacity is 
not considered in terms of humankind as a geophysical and biomorphic force operative in nature, 
but rather remains confined exclusively to the inherent sociability of humans in the sociocultural 
world.  
 
With the shift to the Anthropocene, the continuity between nature and the sociocultural world and 
their mutual implication is the crucial insight from which an analysis of agency has to start. The 
realization has dawned now that human agency is operative not only in the sociocultural world, but 
also in nature. Humans exercise their agency in a number of different temporal contexts through 
different activities by means of which they simultaneously activate a variety of relations. By engaging 
in activities in the sociocultural world, they are simultaneously exerting their agency in nature as 
well as in relation to themselves as subjects. Ever since they have succeeded in extrapolating certain 
potentials encapsulated by their evolutionarily acquired capacities and developed and honed them 
into potent competences, they have been busy, however modestly for a considerable period, on the 
level of natural history, through their participation contributing indirectly to the evolutionary 
emergence of various structures. Today, the altered stratigraphic and species profiles of the planet 
stand as a monument to this natural historical agency of theirs. 
 
Human agency in the sociocultural world exhibits unmistakable signs of the pervasive impact of 
nature, whether natural or biological processes and cycles, through different types of activities and 
their modulation and phasing as well as through numerous organizational features of social life. 
Leaving aside the correspondence between agentic brain modules and the range of activities 
engaged in, there is the social-theoretically important matter of the universal elementary social 
forms that humans through their organic and cognitive endowment have in common with their 
evolutionary ancestors and neighbours and which provide templates for typical activities and their 
institutional and organizational forms. Among them are, for example, socio-ecological forms like 
kinship, dominance, deference, subordination, cooperation, rivalry, competition and conflict (e.g. 
Jackendoff, 1999; Kaufmann and Clément 2007); and coordination forms like attending, comparing, 
relating, combining, ordering, counting, interacting, evaluating and judging (e.g. Piaget 1983). To the 
extent that such forms are enabling by making available a range of capacities, they are directly 
related to agency. But in varying ways they can simultaneously also be and indeed are constraining, 
even to a debilitating degree – such as, for instance, natural social dominance being turned into 
authoritarianism, illegitimate power, discrimination, repression, extra-judicial use of force, genocide 
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and so forth. This is where the possibility and the need arise to enlarge naturally endowed agency by 
extrapolating the dormant potentials of capacities, critically if need be, and developing them into 
socioculturally endorsed, human-specific competences in tune with the sustainability imperatives of 
their Anthropocenic conditions.5 This is where the social-scientific task of critique (Strydom, 2011) 
finds its most basic foothold. 
 
In the sociocultural world, however, agency is most immediately manifest at the level of historicity – 
the process of the creation, production or construction of that form of life. It is due to both its 
centrality and high visibility that this process of becoming is the focal point of many a social theorist 
when explicating agency. Not only is it the seat of social and historical time, but also of social and 
historical action. In locating his argumentation in the domain of humans living and acting together in 
a shared form of life, Barnes for example is emphatic that the key problem of sociology is collective 
agency. His focus is thus trained on inherently sociable actors who engage in social interaction in the 
medium of which they relate and mutually affect each other, while being necessarily actively 
oriented toward collectively accepted norms and rules which, nevertheless, leave them scope for 
freedom and initiative in the generation of all the defining features of their intersubjective world. To 
grasp agency, therefore, sociology has to make intelligible how sociable humans as responsible 
actors who relate to shared norms and rules engage with their environment through their inherited 
knowledge. By means of their temporal theory of agency schooled on the pragmatist model, 
Emirbayer and Mische are able to provide more analytical detail regarding agency at the level of 
historicity. By thus effectively differentiating and suggestively pointing toward a plurality of actors 
who draw differently from their organic endowment and consequently manifest different and even 
competing agentic competences, they in principle mitigate Barnes’ typical sociological tendency to 
over-emphasize collective agency. Synthesizing different theories of agency, they identify routine, 
purposiveness and deliberation/judgement as the three moments comprising the process, while 
these moments are then seen as being modulated by the actors’ variable orientations to the past 
and future from within the present. Depending on the agentic orientation toward time, different 
outcomes emerge: the enactment of past-oriented habitual schemata contributes to the 
reproduction of conditional factors; devising a future-oriented imaginative projection allows 
disburdening of the past, critical reflection and the identification of alternative possibilities; and, 
finally, practical engagement in the present through deliberation about possible avenues to follow 
and evaluation of their feasibility creates opportunities for judiciously and effectively working 
through the contingencies collectively faced in the concrete situation.  
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In the case of the sociocultural world, however, agency can by no means be conceived exclusively 
with reference to the process of creation, production and construction of that world alone. There 
can be no doubt about the fact that the traditional social-theoretical focus on a plurality of socio-
culturally different actors who drive the historical-constructive process through their interaction, 
competition, contestation and conflict as well as learning, alignment and cooperation must and will 
retain its central analytical importance. But now under the currently emerging conditions, historicity 
has to be appreciated as being embedded in a set of relations that involves the remaining two 
infinite processes, natural generation and subject-formation, as well as the cumulative emergence 
and evolutionary stabilization of commonly presupposed rational properties generated by those 
processes. Thus it has a relation also to the structures formed as concomitants of those processes. 
Put in terms employed earlier, agency has a connection with both convergent and divergent series 
and, importantly here, with the respective limit concepts punctuating them (see Figure 1). This 
means that agency, which itself of course features the type of organically rooted cognitive structures 
or schemata characteristic of the subject, must be regarded in its relation both to cultural models 
constructed at the immanent level and to the cognitive order which becomes stabilized at the meta-
cultural or transcendent level. Cultural models concern structures that are equivalent to the limit 
concepts punctuating the three infinite processes of becoming – which means the models of the 
Anthropocene, of a democratic-cosmopolitan world or global society and of a cognitively fluid 
subject. The evolutionarily stabilized principles of the cognitive order – for example, truth, right and 
truthfulness – represent structures that are equivalent to the limit concepts of the three 
concomitant accumulation processes which, in turn, provide the parameters of the cultural models. 
On the one hand, agency as a set of enabling structures or capacities makes possible the 
competences, actions, practices, social interaction, competition, conflict, discourses, evaluations, 
judgements, selections, decisions and institutional and organizational moves that give rise to the 
cultural and meta-cultural structures and thus it contributes – albeit indirectly – to them. But on the 
other, the competences, actions, practices and so forth enabled by agency, and thus agency as a set 
of capacities itself, are both incursively structured and recursively regulated by the cognitive order 6 
and, mediately at the lower immanent level, by cultural models – structures toward which agency is 
reflexively oriented. 
 
The distinction between cultural models and the cognitive order, although theoretically absolutely 
crucial, is nowhere clearly made in the relevant literature due to the prevalence of undifferentiated 
and opaque talk of patterns, symbols, structures, norms, values and rules. And nowhere, further, is 
this distinction linked in any remotely precise manner to the corresponding features of the agentic 
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subject oriented toward and relating to those structures. Nevertheless, Barnes’ position is worth 
mentioning – not, however, because of distinguishing between ‘socially functional values and norms’ 
and ‘universal moral imperatives of which we are transcendentally aware’ (2000: 22) in criticism of 
Parsons, which comes as a total surprize since it makes no sense in the context of his version of 
naturalism and insistence on empiricism. In general, he regards structures not as aggregates of 
similarities between individuals as in rational choice theory, but rather as collective 
accomplishments that have been achieved as agreements overcoming differences through social 
interaction in which the participants mutually affect each other. Of particular interest, however, is 
his account of structure in terms of the ‘delocalised phenomenon…[forming]…a persistent macro-
pattern…[which goes]…unremarked by members…[and]…is manifest…[in]…the distribution of 
knowledge across the collective as a whole’ (Barnes, 2000: 150-51). In fact, he approaches the 
matter still more closely for, rather than simply knowledge, it is a question also of ‘those very 
elements of their [i.e. the members’] awareness that constitute their knowledge’ of structure (2000: 
150). Barnes obviously lacks the appropriate concept to designate these elements, but they are 
actually the cognitive properties or structures that can be found in the heads of the members as 
basic to agency, in immanent cultural models and in transcendent cognitive order principles, and are 
constantly mediated through this threefold framework. 
 
As regards the study of the relation of agency to cultural models and cognitive order principles as 
well as of the incursive structuring and recursive regulating of agency and its entailments by these 
models and principles, then, the focus needs to be on those cognitive properties or structures that 
mediate agentic subjects or actors, conventional culture and meta-culture in the course of the 
temporally unfolding process. Substantively, such an analysis dealing in particular with what takes 
place on the temporally unfolding historical-constructive axis would obviously require the type of 
weak-naturalistic, cognitive-sociological approach with a critical capacity (Strydom, 2011 and 2015a) 
that has been suggested in the foregoing. Indications of an analysis of this type have been offered 
above by way of references to a plurality of different actors, orientations and engagements; 
competition, contestation and conflict; social interaction and discourse; learning, alignment and 
cooperation; limiting, debilitating and deforming elementary natural social forms; the constructive 
generation of a variety of options, selection from among them, decision-making, institutionalization 
and the organization of sociocultural life; and, cognitively crucially, both the positive and negative 
incursive and recursive effects of cultural models and cognitive order principles. In the present 
context, however, it is clearly not possible to attempt to give even an outline of such a complex 
analysis.7 
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Conclusion 
Recently, under changing conditions of existence, humans discovered themselves to be a natural 
category – part of and a force in nature. In response, they have begun to reflect on and re-articulate 
their commonly taken-for-granted cognitive presuppositions in a way that facilitates the 
construction of new directing and guiding cultural models of nature, of their sociocultural world and 
of themselves as agents. Being inseparable from nature yet able to transcend it in certain significant 
respects, the human species is neither just a natural category nor the matrix or the filter of nature, 
but through its sociocultural character rather central to the mediation of nature. 
 
For them, the word or material sign, ‘the Anthropocene’, iconically signifies a new field of concern. 
What it more precisely signifies, the object of reference, embraces, on the one hand, deep time, 
natural history, evolution, global warming, climate change, time-rock and the new geological time 
interval; and, on the other, the cognitively structured cultural models of a species recognizing that it 
has to take responsibility in its social and historical engagements for being a force of nature clothed 
in sociocultural garb – that it has to commit to sociocultural self-creation to secure its conditions of 
existence as a natural category. Beyond the word and the object of reference, the ultimate 
signification, which incorporates a trace of the object, is the in principle intelligible concept of the 
Anthropocene. This concept affects the sign-interpreters in a number of different yet interrelated 
ways – not only logically through its linguistic and logico-numerical presuppositions and formation, 
but simultaneously also emotionally, as evidenced by the heated debates surrounding it, and 
pragmatically so that it is employed for a variety of different, even competing and conflicting 
purposes by scientists, environmentalists, change activists, business executives, politicians, the 
disadvantaged, the poor and both cautious and incautious thinkers, including social theorists. 
 
The problem facing humankind today and in the following number of years is, first of all, to get the 
logical, emotional and pragmatic responses to the concept of the Anthropocene in more or less 
harmonious alignment.8 Without such a collective learning achievement gained through 
competition, conflict, interaction, discourse, deliberation, evaluation and judgement, no selection 
and decision leading to the construction of a proper set of mutually supporting cultural models 
necessary for institutionalization and the associated organization of society will be forthcoming. For 
such alignment and construction, the activation of the dormant potentials of the as yet only partially 
mobilized cognitively fluid mind will be necessary. This implies overcoming certain barriers to the 
free flow of the cognitive properties mediating between heads, cultural models and cognitive order 
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principles. To be sure, the first step toward such elimination of barriers has already been taken with 
the currently widespread insight into the misleading quality and destructive consequences of the 
separation of humans from nature. Whereas the imposition of this separation on the sociocultural 
form of life hitherto led to a hierarchical form of organization of social life which resulted in wasting 
the majority of capacities and talents, the lifting of barriers would enable the maturing of human 
agency – the extrapolation of human capacities and the mobilization of all talents as well as the 
releasing of wealth and power resources from their monopolistic confinement for the purposes of 
the development of the full range of competences called for by the emerging Anthropocenic form of 
life. 
 
If social theorists manage to appreciate that their own agency is implicated and take seriously the 
new field of the sociocultural self-creation of a natural category, then it would sooner or later dawn 
on their minds that a weak naturalistic assumption regarding the continuity of nature and the 
human sociocultural world is unavoidable and, further, that a cognitive theoretical perspective 
possessing a critical capacity is required to come to terms with the – in many respects uniquely 
human – sociocultural mediation of nature.9 
 
                                                          
 
Notes 
 
1 Compare Habermas (2003) on weak naturalism with which he pairs epistemic realism. 
2 Habermas’ (1984) theory of formal pragmatics follows this same line, but as I have argued 
elsewhere (Strydom, 2015a and In press) it has to be transformed both cognitively and sociologically. 
3 For an example of the analysis of the formation of a cultural model, see Strydom (2012). 
4 Unlike Kant’s ideas of reason, the cognitive order principles share the dynamic nature of all things, 
whether natural, social, cultural or individual. However, there is no direct relation between history 
and those principles since their temporality is of an evolutionary kind instead. 
5 The first law of the social sciences, as it were, is as follows: ‘The broad history of the evolution of 
learning seems to have been a slow pushing back of genetic determinism to levels of a higher logical 
type’ (Bateson, 1973: 278). 
6 This notion is important for understanding social structure in distinction to cultural structure. 
Incursive structuration and recursive regulation or ‘transcendental indexing’ opens a ‘space of 
placement’ (Badiou, 2009: 6), such as for example the modern class structure, and not only a ‘space 
of reasons’ (Habermas 2003: 132). 
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7 For the theoretical-methodological specification of such analysis as well as examples of substantive 
analyses, see Strydom (2012, 2015b and 2015c). 
8 Perhaps, the Paris agreement of 12 December 2015 at COP21 involving 195 nations may be 
regarded as a first step toward such harmonization. 
9 Human uniqueness is captured by the cognitive metaproblematic: that something belonging to the 
world is nevertheless able to take distance from, develop a perspective on, assume any of a number 
of relations to, and engage with the world. 
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